Tulsa Law Review
Volume 54

Issue 2

Article 3

Winter 2019

Treaty Interpretation: Rule of Politics over Rule of Law?
Lisa Baldez

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lisa Baldez, Treaty Interpretation: Rule of Politics over Rule of Law?, 54 Tulsa L. Rev. 211 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss2/3

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Baldez: Treaty Interpretation: Rule of Politics over Rule of Law?
BALDEZ, L-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

2/15/2019 3:12 PM

TREATY INTERPRETATION: RULE OF POLITICS
OVER RULE OF LAW?
Lisa Baldez*
GREGORY H. FOX, PAUL R. DUBINSKY AND BRAD R. ROTH, EDS., SUPREME LAW
OF THE LAND? DEBATING THE CONTEMPORARY EFFECTS OF TREATIES
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS 2017). PP. 514. HARDCOVER $91.35. PAPERBACK $44.99.
DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2016). PP. 472.
HARDCOVER $95.00.

Americans are currently living in a moment of extreme hostility toward international
law. Under the Trump Administration, the United States government has pulled out of
major international agreements (including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on
Iran’s nuclear program and the Paris Agreement on climate change) on the grounds that
they were “bad deals” for the American people. The U.S. has withdrawn from the U.N.
Human Rights Council and has threatened to withdraw from the World Trade
Organization. These moves reflect deep antipathy for international law and a belief that
adherence to international agreements compromises American interests. The overarching
view is articulated in a draft executive order that, if enacted, would issue a moratorium on
multilateral treaties: “[T]hese types of treaties are . . . used to force countries to adhere to
often radical domestic agendas that could not, themselves, otherwise be enacted with a
country’s domestic laws.”1 This understanding of treaties—that they impose policies that
a country would not otherwise adopt—has undergirded conservative thinking since the
creation of the United Nations. Conservative Republicans have sought to thwart American

*
Professor of Government and Latin American, Latino and Caribbean Studies at Dartmouth College. Her
most recent book, Defying Convention: U.S. Resistance to the U.N. Treaty on Women’s Rights (Cambridge
University Press, 2014), examines the battles over ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women in the United States.
1. Courtenay R. Conrad & Emily Ritter, A Trump Moratorium on International Treaties Could Roll Back
Human Rights – Here at Home, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/03/01/a-trump-moratorium-on-international-treaties-could-roll-back-human-rights-here-at-home/
?utm_term=.0a6427817919 (Mar. 1, 2017).
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engagement with treaties, human rights treaties in particular, in many ways since then,
from proposing constitutional amendments that would ban ratification of human rights
treaties to grassroots mobilization opposing the appointment of Supreme Court justices
hostile to international law.2 What impact have these efforts had on treaty law in the United
States? Are treaties still the “supreme law of the land” as Article VI of the Constitution
avers? These two books offer rich responses to these questions.
A key issue at the center of both books is whether or not treaties are presumed to be
self-executing, in terms of automatically entering into force upon ratification. They both
concur that contemporary jurisprudence maintains that self-execution is optional.3 As of
today, treaties do not automatically supersede conflicting state law. Their relationship to
conflicting state law depends on whether they are self-executing and automatically enter
into force, or non-self-executing and thus requiring domestic legislation in order to be
implemented.4
Fox, Dubinsky and Roth, and the authors of the chapters in the edited volume, accept
as given the “optional” aspect of self-execution and focus on the implications of that
interpretation. They pose the erosion of treaty supremacy as a question (indicated by the
question mark in the title Supreme Law of the Land?) and examine the degree to which it
can be said to exist across a range of legal issues. For Sloss, on the other hand, current
interpretations of treaty doctrine break with historical precedent and rest on incorrect
interpretations of the law.5 A precipitous change in the interpretation of treaty law occurred
in the postwar era and this change represents the death of treaty supremacy (hence the
eponymous title, The Death of Treaty Supremacy).6
As an edited volume, Supreme Law of the Land? is organized around a series of
questions about treaty supremacy. Each of the authors focus on the significance of the
Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations law of the United States for various legal
issues.7 The editors take the Third Restatement as a baseline and seek to determine
“whether developments since 1987 have affirmed the Restatement rules, modified them in
some discernible fashion, or abandoned them altogether,” 8 with the intention of providing
“as complete a record as possible of the Third Restatement’s impact or lack thereof” and
thus influencing the drafting of the Fourth Restatement, which is now in process. 9 When

2. Mark Weston Janis & Noam Wiener, Treaties in U.S. Law from the Founding to the Restatement (Third),
in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND? 15, 48–50 (Gregory H. Fox et al. eds., 2017).
3. DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY 5 (2016); David P. Stewart, Recent Trends in U.S.
Treaty Implementation, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 228, 229, 234–36.
4. Stewart, supra note 3, at 250.
5. SLOSS, supra note 3, at 310–18.
6. Id. at 5–6.
7. Restatements are a legal resource created by the American Law Institute to be used by lawyers and judges.
They summarize existing case law into a comprehensive body of knowledge. As the ALI website affirms, “[t]hey
aim at clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently
stands or might appropriately be stated by a court.” Frequently Asked Questions, ALI., https://www.ali.org
/publications/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). The First Restatement was completed in
1944, the Second in 1965 and the Third in 1987. The ALI is currently in the process of drafting the Fourth
Restatement.
8. Gregory H. Fox, Paul R. Dubinsky & Brad R. Roth, Introduction, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra
note 2, at 1, 4.
9. Id. at 14.
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it comes to treaty law, one of the main guidelines that the Third Restatement affirms is the
doctrine of self-execution: treaties are generally considered to automatically determine
domestic law, unless stated otherwise. 10 What the authors find across a range of areas is
that this basic premise of the Third Restatement has, for the most part, not been heeded by
case law.
In general, the authors in this volume have a sanguine view of the Third Restatement.
As the editors affirm, “the treaty norms of the Third Restatement were almost entirely
uncontroversial during their drafting and were received largely without critical rebuke by
federal courts and leading scholars.”11 In Chapter 2, Gregory H. Fox presents empirical
evidence that supports this view. Fox finds no evidence of dispute over the question of
self-execution during the process of drafting the Restatement, in the court cases that
followed the Third Restatement or in scholarly analysis in the ten years following its
adoption.12 Nonetheless, as the chapters of this study unfold, it becomes clear that the
Third Restatement has been honored more in the breach when it comes to the question of
self-execution.
The book begins with a sweeping historical overview of U.S. treaty law starting with
the Founding. In the introductory chapter, Mark Janis and Noam Wiener highlight the
impact of political and historical context on the ways that treaties have been understood
and implemented over time, starting with the creation of the republic.13 They argue that
domestic treaty obligations have waxed and waned over time depending on the nature of
the relationship between the federal government and the states.14 They highlight historical
continuity in the way that race has often been at the center of disputes over the jurisdiction
of treaties.15 The emphasis on historical continuity and ambivalence about changes in
treaty law differs markedly from the perspective offered by Sloss, who interprets
contemporary treaty law as the result of a decisive and deeply problematic shift. 16
In Chapter 3, Paul R. Dubinsky describes the history of treaty interpretation in terms
of three analogies. The vision of “treaty as contract” viewed treaties in terms of private
law; this perspective helped to establish the U.S. as a legitimate and equal partner vis-àvis foreign powers at the time of the Founding.17 As the substance of treaties expanded
beyond commerce and property rights, a second understanding of “treaty as statute”
emerged, which allowed more room for interpretation about what a treaty entailed and
viewed treaties more like pieces of legislation.18 These two views of treaties existed side
by side for two hundred years.19 In the wake of the Third Restatement—as well as
subsequent decisions that ignored the Third Restatement—a third model emerged, “treaty
10. Ingrid Wuerth, Self-Execution, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 148, 148–49.
11. Fox et al., supra note 8, at 5.
12. Gregory H. Fox, Treaties in the Third Restatement, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 55,
91.
13. Janis & Wiener, supra note 2, at 15.
14. Id. at 54.
15. Id. at 46.
16. SLOSS, supra note 3, at 1–5.
17. Paul Dubinsky, Competing Models for Treaty Interpretation, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra
note 2, at 92, 99–106.
18. Id. at 106–15.
19. Id. at 92–96.
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as delegation.”20 Dubinsky finds this contemporary mode of thinking problematic in part
because Congress rarely actually explicitly delegates the power to interpret treaties to the
executive branch and, moreover, this vision of treaties is not grounded in law but in
political imperatives.21 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., treaty interpretation has been guided by
the policy priorities of the executive branch rather than the rule of law—and thus has
departed from the Third Restatement. 22
In Chapter 4, Ingrid Wuerth examines the doctrine of self-execution in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas.23 She finds that the presumption of
non-self-execution that has increasingly guided the interpretation of human rights treaties
has bled over to other types of treaties—particularly those regarding “property, contract
and commercial rights.”24 Wuerth sees this trend as potentially “undermin[ing] the
domestic enforcement of treaties long understood to be directly enforceable in U.S.
courts.”25 She holds both Medellín and the Third Restatement responsible here, on the
grounds that they both offer contradictory guidance on self-execution. The majority
opinion in Medellín stipulated that decisions made by the International Court of Justice are
non-self-executing in the U.S. The U.S. is therefore obliged to comply with international
law—but that obligation does not automatically require domestic action. Whether or not it
does depends on the “intent of U.S. treaty makers” (166). This raises of series of questions
for Wuerth: Is there a presumption of non-self-execution? What aspects of the text of a
treaty are dispositive in determining self-execution? How should domestic courts interpret
non-self-executing agreements? She concludes that the justices addressed the question of
self-execution explicitly but in ways that have sown confusion.
Margaret McGuinness’s chapter traces the history of the relationship between
federalism and treaties, highlighting the central tension that exists between the federal
government’s ability to make and uphold international agreements, and limits on the
ability of the federal government to impose authority over states.26 She argues that federal
treaty making power, especially as affirmed in Missouri v. Holland, has not substantially
violated state autonomy and that concerns about whether the “U.S. [is] a significantly less
reliable treaty partner” are unwarranted. 27 As McGuinness puts it, Missouri v. Holland “is
often described as standing for the basic proposition that the national government can do
through treaty what it otherwise may not do through national legislation.”28 As
McGuinness notes, however, this fear has not been realized; the federal government has
not exercised the power to impose international law on states and localities, as critics of

20. Id. at 145.
21. Id. at 145–47.
22. Dubinsky, supra note 17, at 134 (discussing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)).
23. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
24. Wuerth, supra note 10, at 177.
25. Id. at 149.
26. See Margaret E. McGuiness, Treaties, Federalism, and the Contested Legacy of Missouri v. Holland, in
SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 179.
27. Id. at 226.
28. Id. at 195.
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Missouri vs. Holland feared.29 Instead, the executive branch has acceded to reservations,
understandings and declarations (RUDs) that limit the domestic application of
international law.30 She is sanguine about new federalist approaches to treaties, arguing
that RUDs are a viable way to balance U.S. commitments to international human rights
law because they facilitate U.S. ratification while allowing a range of local and state
responses to treaty obligations.31
Much of the political struggle over treaties rests on an assumption that self-executing
treaties differ from non-self-executing ones.32 In Chapter 6, David P. Stewart subjects the
concept of self-execution to scrutiny and finds that, since the 1980s, very few treaties of
the treaties deemed self-executing have actually been free of implementing legislation.
Regardless of the type of treaty, “the majority . . . denominated ‘self-executing’ actually
rest upon, and are effectively implemented by, existing legislation.” 33 Moreover, the
empirical record does not support the Third Restatement assumption that self-executing
treaties are more efficient in terms of clarity, speed or scope of compliance. 34 He seeks to
identify patterns in the conditions under which implementing legislation is required, and
what that legislation entails—but finds no systematic explanations.35 Overlapping
domestic law almost always renders treaty implementation a complex process that requires
some implementing legislation: “in an increasingly multilateral world, treaty compliance
is an ongoing task, not a ‘one and done’ undertaking that ends at ratification.”36 Thus,
Stewart’s analysis suggests that “self-execution” is really a misnomer—a legal fiction.37
Much of the attention to treaties focus on Article II treaties, those signed by the
president and approved by a Senate supermajority. 38 Michael D. Ramsey’s chapter
reminds us that there are other kinds of international agreements, with Article II treaties
representing “only a tiny fraction” of the international agreements to which the U.S. is a
party—just 12% from 1980 to 2000.39 He maintains that “there is no satisfactory
explanation for why some agreements are made one way and some in others,” with the
exception of international trade deals which almost always take the form of CongressionalExecutive agreements.40 In terms of sheer numbers, if not importance, most international
agreements are made solely by the president. Both Stewart’s and Ramsey’s chapters
suggest opportunities for further research. Quantitative analysis would be well suited for
testing their conclusions that there are no systematic patterns in whether implementing
legislation or why international agreements take the form they do. 41

29. See McGuiness, supra note 26, at 195–213.
30. Id. at 190.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 229.
33. Id. at 271.
34. Stewart, supra note 3, at 233.
35. Id. at 234–36.
36. Id. at 281.
37. Id. at 280.
38. Michael D. Ramsey, The Treaty and Its Rivals: Making International Agreements in U.S. Law and
Practice, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 282.
39. Id. at 283.
40. Id. at 284.
41. See Stewart, supra note 3; Ramsey, supra note 38.
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In Chapter 8, Roger P. Alford explores the role of courts in enforcing treaties and
discusses four ways in which the power of courts to adjudicate treaties has been
constrained.42 Pursuant to Medellín, there is a presumption that private actors lack legal
standing when it comes to international treaties, and thus cannot invoke treaty rights in a
court of law.43 The “last-in-time” rule suggests that, in the case of overlapping jurisdiction
or conflict between a treaty and a domestic statute, the more recently approved one takes
precedence; this rule limits court jurisdiction.44 If an issue is deemed a “political question,”
then it cannot be subject to interpretation by the court—but the conditions under which
this holds are unclear.45 Alford finds the criteria that have been applied to designate a
question political to be “malleable,” “ambiguous,” “inconsistent,” and “unpredictable.” 46
Finally, international treaties, and particularly human rights treaties, increasingly rely on
RUDs that “preclude the direct application of international law.” 47 Alford acknowledges
the pros and cons of these restrictions. RUDs, for example, are a way of brokering
compromise between internationalists and isolationists, allowing the U.S. to comply with
human rights standards without “the direct application of international law.” 48 But
ultimately Alford finds these trends troubling in terms of the importance of upholding and
hewing to international legal obligations. 49
Geoffrey S. Corn and Dru Brenner-Beck’s chapter provides a case study of the way
treaty interpretation has played out with regard to the law of armed conflict (LOAC). 50
They illustrate significant moments in LOAC with regard to the role that Congress, the
executive and courts have played in interpreting the Geneva Conventions and the Chemical
Warfare Convention in particular.51 Consistent with other chapters’ emphasis on political
considerations, they maintain that “the Senate’s decision to consent to treaty obligations
will often fluctuate based on the broader national sense of geostrategic necessity.” 52 They
provide a detailed analysis of historical examples to show that both executive and
congressional support are necessary for the ratification of international treaties. 53
Corn and Brenner-Beck’s analysis stands out within this volume in its reference to
the significance of a denial of cert.54 Most of the other chapters focus primarily on cases
that were granted cert and are thus potentially biased in terms of case selection. 55 When
he was released from prison after serving a seventeen-year term, Panamanian General

42. See Roger P. Alford, Judicial Barriers to the Enforcement of Treaties, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?,
supra note 2, at 333.
43. Id. at 336–37.
44. Id. at 339.
45. Id. at 343.
46. Id. at 346–47.
47. Alford, supra note 42, at 354.
48. Id.
49. See generally Alford, supra note 42.
50. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Dru Brenner-Beck, Case Study No. 1: Exploring U.S. Treaty Practice Through
a Military Lens, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 358.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 362.
53. Id. at 363.
54. Id. at 383.
55. See generally SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?.
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Manuel Noriega petitioned the Supreme Court to determine whether France’s extradition
request violated his rights as a prisoner of war under the Third Geneva Convention. 56 The
Supreme Court refused to hear the case—but Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented on the
denial of cert on the grounds that hearing the case would resolve lingering questions about
self-execution.57 Inclusion of cases that were denied cert provides one way to strengthen
the validity of claims about the conditions that shape treaty interpretation.
In Chapter 10, Paul Dubinsky provides a second case study that traces the rise of the
United States as a global leader in the area of private international law (PIL). 58 In the
postwar era, the U.S. became a major economic power but lacked the legal infrastructure
to support globalization.59 Starting in the 1960s, the U.S. sought to address this lacuna by
joining a large number of private international law treaties in a short period of time. 60
Engagement with these treaties imposed costs—”real requirements and limitations”—on
state courts, yet the predominant focus on interstate trade ensured that these efforts
generated “no significant opposition.” 61 By the 1980s, the U.S. had become a leader in
this arena.62 The expansion of issues addressed by PIL in the 1980s raised federalist
concerns about state interests and prompted a retraction of American leadership, a trend
that Dubinsky finds troubling on the grounds that U.S. participation strengthens the PIL
regime overall.63
In the concluding chapter, Gary Born highlights the theme of American ambivalence
about treaties.64 As Born observes, “the United States appears simultaneously both to
value and to devalue treaties.”65 He maintains that this ambivalence has shown remarkable
continuity over time: “misgivings of almost exactly the same sort have been a recurrent
feature of U.S. law and politics since the earliest days of the Republic.” 66 The authors in
this volume are also ambivalent about contemporary treaty interpretation, with some
expressing concern and others more sanguine about the degree to which federalism has
reshaped understandings of American treaty obligations. 67
A certain amount of ambivalence is appropriate for an edited volume that represents
the views of many different scholars. In The Death of Treaty Supremacy, however, David
Sloss is neither ambivalent nor sanguine about the current status of treaties in the U.S.
Sloss makes four main points in this book.68 First, current treaty law entails a presumption
of non-self-execution, but it has mistakenly fused the doctrine of treaty supremacy with

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
Dubinsky, supra note 17, at 411–60.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 422–23.
See Dubinsky, supra note 17, at 430–35.
See id. at 435–38.
Gary B. Born, Conclusion: Treaties as the Law of the Land: Change and Continuity, in SUPREME LAW
OF THE LAND?, supra note 2, at 461, 463.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 469.
67. Id.
68. See SLOSS, supra note 3.
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the doctrine of self-execution.69 Second, from the Founding of the republic until World
War II, these two doctrines operated completely separately from one another, and should
be separated today.70 Third, the fusion of the doctrines of treaty supremacy and selfexecution occurred in the wake of the formation of the United Nations and the global
embrace of international agreements that recast racial discrimination as a matter of foreign
policy.71 American conservatives saw the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as threats and they reacted by seeking to curtail the power
of treaties to affect domestic policy. 72 What resulted, Sloss argues, was legal doctrine
based on political preferences rather than sound legal precedent.73 Fourth, this change, a
radical departure from two hundred years of precedent, is an invisible constitutional
change that occurred without the American people weighing in on its consequences for the
protection of their human rights.74
The first half of the book is devoted to demonstrating the status of treaty supremacy
doctrine.75 Sloss’s main argument here is that the presumption of non-self-execution as
applied to treaty law is a relatively new phenomenon in the history of the country’s
constitutional jurisprudence.76 As he puts it, “from the Founding until World War II, treaty
supremacy cases and self-execution cases proceeded along two independent, nonintersecting paths.”77 The section on the establishment of treaty supremacy during the
Founding is relatively short because, Sloss maintains, scholars do not dispute the status of
treaty supremacy during that time period. Sloss dedicates considerably more effort to the
period from 1800 to 1945.78 The exhaustive documentation that he provides here aims to
demonstrate that treaties were simply assumed to be self-executing; the question of the
relationship between self-execution and treaty supremacy was rarely even mentioned. 79
The evidence here challenges the effort by conservative legal scholars to claim historical
precedent for non-self-execution doctrine prior to 1945.80 One of the cases that Sloss
analyzes is Foster v. Neilson, the case that many scholars point to as the basis of NSE
doctrine.81 The analysis delves deeply into the details of the historical context in which
the case occurred.82 He maintains that those who view Foster as the basis for NSE doctrine
rely on a “mythical view” of the case, based on cherry-picking language from that case,
taking it out of context of the rest of the decision and inflating the significance of a single
passage that appears at the tail end of a decision (i.e., “the sixty-first page of a sixty-four

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 1–13.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 204.
See SLOSS, supra note 3, 204–08.
See id. at 1–13.
See id. at 17–169.
See id.
Id. at 265.
See SLOSS, supra note 3, 67–169.
See id.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 67.
See id. at 67–84.
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page decision”).83
From Sloss’s perspective, the self-execution doctrine was clear and unequivocal
from the Founding to the postwar era.84 Moreover, it constituted “good law,” founded on
solid legal principles and precedent.85 As Sloss shows in exhaustive detail, treaty
supremacy is relevant only in cases where treaty law conflicts with state law. 86 For most
of history, this is how treaty supremacy was understood. After 1965, however, judges
began to invoke the doctrine of treaty supremacy in cases involving the relationship
between treaties and the federal government and/or Congress’s regulatory power despite
the fact that these relationships are not governed by Article VI of the Constitution and thus
ought not to be relevant to treaty supremacy. 87 The Genocide Convention provides one
simple example. Legislators have insisted that the Genocide Convention and other human
rights agreements are not self-executing, but Sloss dismisses this claim as based on a
misapprehension of the law: “[t]he Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule means that treaties
supersede conflicting state laws. The only type of state law that would present a genuine
conflict with the Genocide Convention would be one authorizing genocide.” 88 As Sloss
points out, there are no state laws governing genocide.
For two hundred years, treaty supremacy and self-execution never came up in the
same legal cases: “in cases where one party alleged a conflict between a treaty and state
law, the question of whether the treaty was self-executing was almost never raised.”89
Self-execution doctrine was developed to address questions about the implementation of
treaties “that regulate matters within the scope of Congress’s legislative powers” and was
not relevant to treaties that addressed laws that fell within the jurisdiction of individual
states.90 To provide an example: if a treaty requires an appropriation of funds, then it must
stipulate a self-executing clause directing Congress to appropriate those funds, consistent
with separation of powers among the branches of government. 91 Few cases are ever this
simple—and Sloss patiently walks through the logic of innumerable, more complex cases
to illustrate that clear distinctions existed between the proper application of treaty
supremacy (relating to states) and self-execution (relating to separation of powers). 92
In Part Three, Sloss traces the gradual process by which the doctrines of treaty
supremacy and non-self-execution became enmeshed with one another. 93 He bases his
claims on a detailed analysis of Supreme Court decisions and lower court cases, scholarly
commentary and the drafting of the Second Restatement. 94 Sloss argues that the doctrine
of non-self-execution emerged as a conservative reaction to the “magnetic pull of

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

SLOSS, supra note 3, at 67.
Id. at 59‒66.
Id. at 1‒5.
See, e.g., id. at 72.
Id. at 6‒8.
SLOSS, supra note 3, at 205.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 3.
See, e.g., id. at 72.
See id. at 129‒52.
See SLOSS, supra note 3, at 181‒284.
Id.
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international human rights norms.” 95
Do international human rights treaties bestow individuals with rights that can be
invoked in domestic courts of law? This emerged as a pressing issue in the midst of the
creation of the United Nations, when African American organizations envisioned the
fledgling institution as a place to redress racial discrimination—and American
conservatives reacted by seeking to limit the U.N.’s power over domestic policy. 96 Sloss’s
account examines the legal consequences of this political conflict. Given the doctrine of
treaty supremacy as it was then understood, the U.N. treaties should have superseded
conflicting state law—but the prospect of overturning state laws governing the rights of
individual citizens proved untenable for many policymakers. 97 A new interpretation of
treaty supremacy emerged as a compromise: treaties do not necessarily supersede
conflicting local law unless the treaty is self-executing.98 This interpretation has evolved
over time, but is the current standard defining the relationship between international
treaties and domestic law.99
What happened in the postwar era? The prohibition on racial discrimination in two
of the founding documents of the U.N.—the Charter and the UDHR—prompted a
conservative reaction in the U.S. in which lawmakers sought to limit their domestic
effect.100 John Bricker, a Republican Senator from Ohio, and Frank Holman, president of
the American Bar Association, spearheaded this effort.101 In response to this conservative
reaction, the threat of a constitutional amendment that would prevent the president from
signing human rights treaties, and the prospect of international law overshadowing the
Constitution on the issue of human rights (and racial discrimination in particular), the
doctrine of treaty supremacy was reinterpreted. As a result, the issue of treaty supremacy
became decoupled from the doctrine of self-execution, paving the way for self-execution
to become optional.102
This change took a while to register in case law. Cases taken on and opinions
rendered by the Supreme Court in the ensuing decade do not reflect the NSE exception,
and there is only mixed evidence that the change mattered in lower federal and state courts
initially.103 Not until the American Law Institute (ALI) endorsed it in the Second
Restatement did this change become evident in case law. 104 To illustrate this gap, Sloss
describes in detail a series of cases in which the U.N. Charter had obvious relevance to the
legal issue at hand but was not mentioned in the opinion—notably Brown v. Board of
Education.105 He argues that the Supreme Court did not mention the U.N. Charter in these
cases because the justices realized that doing so would have tacitly acknowledged that it
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Id. at 181.
See id. at 185‒91, 198‒200.
See id. at 211.
SLOSS, supra note 3, at 231.
See id. at 295‒318.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 224.
See SLOSS, supra note 3, at 248, 254‒55.
Id. at 258, 265; see also id. at 257.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 240 (discussing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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provided a stronger defense of rights than did the U.S. Constitution. 106 Moreover, the selfexecution question did not come up in any of these cases. 107 As a result, “as of 1948 the
conceptual firewall that insulated treaty supremacy doctrine from self-execution doctrine
remained largely intact.”108
One important exception is Fujii v. California, which “is one of the few cases in
which a U.S. court applied the Charter’s human rights provisions in conjunction with the
Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule to invalidate a state law.”109 Senator Forrest Donnell,
a Republican from Missouri, convened a debate on the floor of the Senate to discuss the
Fujii case on April 28, 1950—four days after the decision had been handed down.110 This
kind of attention to a pending decision by a lower court was “extremely unusual.” 111
Donnell and others were concerned about the potential for Fujii to set a precedent for
international human rights treaties overriding domestic law—with regard to racial
discrimination, but also sex discrimination.112 Republican Senator Homer Ferguson from
Michigan expressed concerns that Fujii implied that “the U.N. Charter ‘may . . . nullify or
make void all statutes in any State in relation to distinctions made between the sexes.”113
These concerns were prophetic for the time. Sloss claims that the basis for the Fujii
decision cannot be found in law and contravenes 150 years of legal precedent of treaty
supremacy.114 From his perspective, the decision in Fujii represents a solution to a
political problem rather than a sound legal argument. The decision “enabl[ed] the U.S.
political system to accommodate the demands of Bricker and his supporters without
adopting a formal constitutional amendment.” 115 This conflict prompted the treaty
supremacy rule to become “‘unstuck’ from its traditional moorings.” 116
Sloss delves deeply into the details of the drafting of the Second Restatement to
discover why that document codified an interpretation of law that contravened what had
up to that point been an uncontroversial principle. 117 Drawing on the archival records of
the Ford Foundation and the American Law Institute, Sloss argues that the prior
experiences of key decision makers shaped the drafting of the Second Restatement. 118
Particularly critical was the participation of a handful of ALI reporters who had worked in
the State Department during the years of discussion of the Bricker Amendment; these men
were keenly aware of the political conflicts that erupted over human rights treaties and
eager to avoid them.119 As Sloss puts it, “the conference records show that the Bricker
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Amendment controversy cast a long shadow over the ALI’s deliberations.” 120
Sloss suggests that the affirmation of the need to refer to the intent of treaty makers
to address the question of self-execution is a legal fiction based on sloppy legal analysis.121
The Second Restatement asserts that the doctrine of non-self-execution was consistent
with Senate practice of “insert[ing] an understanding or reservation that the treaty should
not be the supreme law of the land until further action is taken by Congress”—although
“the Senate had never [up to that point] adopted an NSE reservation as a condition of its
consent to treaty ratification.”122 Furthermore, the Second Restatement reflected a
misapprehension of international law and in some places conflated international and
domestic law.123
Sloss suggests that the ALI reporters who drafted this section of the Second
Restatement did not want to admit that their decision was influenced—or, perhaps,
determined—by the Bricker Amendment controversy. 124 Moreover, and more
problematically from a legal perspective, if they had affirmed treaty supremacy in this
context, “they would have been tacitly admitting that the Charter provided stronger
protection against racial discrimination than did the Fourteenth Amendment.” 125 Thus,
asserting that treaties were not necessarily self-executing “helped judges preserve their
faith in American exceptionalism by ducking the uncomfortable question of whether
international human rights law provided stronger protection for human rights than does
the U.S. Constitution.”126
Sloss considers this shift to be deeply problematic. First, it emerged as the
unintended consequence of a political response to U.N. human rights treaties rather than
the accumulation of solid legal opinions.127 Second, the consequences of this change have
been profound but largely imperceptible, to judges and policymakers as well as the
American people.128 Third, the presumption that human rights treaties are non-selfexecuting leaves American citizens unprotected by basic principles of universal human
rights as defined in international law—and unaware of what we lack.129 Strangely, while
the Third Restatement is the central focus of Supreme Law of the Land?, Sloss does not
address it. Do the arguments that Sloss makes about the faulty foundations of treaty law
hold for the Third Restatement as well as the Second? The lacuna is curious.
Overall, The Death of Treaty Supremacy offers an extremely thorough analysis of
the institutional context, scholarly commentary and details of relevant cases. Nonetheless,
Sloss’s analysis may be biased by the way he selects cases for analysis. He selects for
review cases that mention the terms he is interested in. For example, in his effort to
determine the impact of the Fujii decision, he reviewed the “sixteen decisions between
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1946 and 1965 in which a party raised a treaty-based claim or defense and one or more
justices relied expressly on a treaty to support his opinion.”130 It’s possible that judges
denied cert to cases that pertained to treaties, and that including those negative cases in his
analysis would change the kinds of inferences he draws.
In the current presidential administration, there has been a concerted effort to
abrogate America’s treaty obligations. At the bottom of this effort is a belief that American
interests at home and abroad are ill-served by cooperating with foreign powers. These
policies represent the logical, or perhaps illogical, extension of the thinking underlying the
“new federalist” era that began in the 1980s.131 As Margaret McGuinness puts it in her
chapter, this approach rests on “a deep skepticism of the power of international law to
solve global problems, a rejection of at least some of the normative foundations of the
international legal order, a concern about the antidemocratic nature of international
lawmaking, and a view that international law-making could be used to dilute state and
local power in ways that were offensive to constitutional structure and the ideals of
federalism.”132 In The Death of Treaty Supremacy, Sloss excavates the origins of these
views and lays bare the faulty legal reasoning that underlies them.
These two books offer extremely rich analyses of a wide range of issues surrounding
treaty interpretation, only a few of which have I been able to explore here. Taken together,
they provide considerable insight on how the legal terrain surrounding treaties has changed
over time. The authors differ in terms of how they characterize the history of these changes.
From the perspective of the authors in Supreme Law of the Land? concerns about
competing jurisdiction between treaties and state law are part and parcel of federalism;
moreover, it is possible to trace the current administration’s ideology back to the Founding,
where federalist-inspired concerns about treaty obligations were central to the
establishment of the republic. Sloss’s account emphasizes historical discontinuity and
argues that current treaty doctrine is a politically-inspired aberration from longstanding
precedent. Despite their differences, however, these two books concur that politics has
overtaken the rule of law in troubling ways.
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